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Recognition and Enforcement of U.S.
Punitive Damages Awards in




In an unpublished product liability case, a federal district court in
Alabama entered a one million dollars judgment against an Italian
manufacturer accused of producing a defective item that allegedly
contributed to the death of the plaintiff's son. The court did not
specify the apportionment of contributory and punitive damages
against the Italian corporation. The Italian court of first impression
(the Venice Court of Appeals) refused to recognize and enforce the
Alabama judgment, concluding that the award was punitive in nature
and, therefore, contrary to domestic public policy. An appeal ensued
but the Suprema Corte di Cassazione found no fault in the lower
court's ruling and upheld it on the ground that the Italian system of
civil liability was strictly compensatory, not punitive.
Some authors have argued that punitive damages in the United
States tend to fully compensate the injured party for otherwise non-
compensable losses (i.e., legal fees, non-economic damages). If this
were the case, it would follow that the decision of the Italian Supreme
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Court discussed in this article is incorrect and ought to be revised.
However, the history of the punitive damages doctrine in the
United States, though still subject to controversy, shows that it has
nothing to do with making the plaintiff whole. The U.S. Supreme
Court has on several occasions emphasized that the purpose of
punitive damages is not compensation of the plaintiff for any
detriment suffered, but rather punishment of the wrongdoer. The
U.S. Congress, too, has ascertained that punitive damages are
intended to punish the wrongdoer and not to compensate the victim
for lost wages or pain and suffering.
Consequently, in framing the function of punitive damages as
essentially retaliatory, the Corte di Cassazione in Fimez appears
consistent with Italian law and the majority of American legal
scholarship on the issue. Nevertheless, punitive damages embody an
anomalous doctrine bridging private law and criminal law. Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that punitive damages serve
the same purposes as criminal penalties, this legal mechanism of
recovery continues to be used within the civil process, where the
heightened protections of a criminal trial are not observed and
standards of proof are lower.
The clash between legal systems is thus at a political level. In
Italy, judges may not create new remedies in the absence of statutory
authority, especially if criminal penalties imposed within civil
proceedings are what is at stake. In this context, surprisingly, the
Corte di Cassazione in Fimez did not mention the system of checks
and balances set forth by Article 25 of the Italian Republic
Constitution, which is the stiffest hurdle to the transplant (or, for the
purposes of this article, the judicial recognition) of the punitive
damages doctrine.
Total rejection of U.S. punitive damages awards, however, is not
the only possible answer. This article intends to demonstrate that, in
order to avoid a perverse denial of justice, it is preferable that the
enforcing judge analyze the nature of the foreign judgment in depth
and try to distinguish between the different categories of damages,
thus enforcing only those compatible with Italian law (that is, at least
enforcing the compensatory part of the award, if any). If, as in the
instant case, a U.S. judgment does not elaborate on the
apportionment of compensatory and punitive damages, foreign courts
should apply the guidelines generally employed within their own




When dealing with U.S. awards of punitive damages, judges
operating in those countries in which punitive damages are deemed
contrary to public policy should try to decipher the amount of
compensatory damages and limit their enforcement to that portion of
damages that are not punitive. Absent such a differentiation, it
should be the enforcing judge's job to read between the lines and, in
the interest of justice, extrapolate a number that would compensate,
even if imprecisely, the plaintiff for the losses suffered. A
transnational lawyer seeking recognition of punitive damages awards
is thus called to play a creative role before the foreign enforcing
judge, coming forward with clear evidence of her client's
compensable losses that - because of the peculiarity of the legal
system - had they not been incorporated under the punitive
damages label would remain uncompensated.
Finally, there is a mounting risk of the improper use of pain and
suffering awards in the United States aimed at fully replacing punitive
damages and purporting punitive aims. This recent trend may
represent a misleading pathway to the recognition and enforcement
of U.S. punitive damages awards in civil law systems, where pain and
suffering awards are totally legitimate and do not raise any public
policy questions. This article suggests that the enforcing judge should
go beyond structural appearances and question the authentic function
of such unreliable "pain and suffering" awards.
II. The 2007 Decision of the Italian Supreme Court. The
Reasons for a Rejection1
In 1985, a young motorcyclist lost his life in a motorcycle
accident in Alabama due to an alleged defect in the design and
manufacture of the buckle of his helmet. As a result of an impact
with a car, the buckle broke and the motorcyclist lost his helmet. The
motorcyclist's only heir brought suit against all subjects directly or
indirectly involved in the accident, seeking joint and several liability
with an award of three million dollars. The Italian manufacturer of
that buckle did not take part in a settlement agreement reached by all
of the other involved parties. As a result, the Italian corporation was
1. See Corte app. Venezia, 15 oct. 2001, n.1359, Giur. It. II 2002, 1021. For a
translation of the holding, see Lucia Ostoni, Italian Rejection of Punitive Damages in
a US. Judgment, 24 J. L. & COM. 245, 251 (2005); see also Alessandro Barzaghi,
Recognition and Enforcement of United States Judgments in Italy, 18 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 61,117-121 (2005).
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left as the only defendant at trial. Eventually, the district court in
Jefferson County, Alabama found for the plaintiff and ordered the
defendant to pay one million dollars in damages, without specifying
the apportionment of compensatory and punitive damages.2 The
prevailing party at trial filed a petition in the Court of Appeals of
Venice for the recognition and enforcement of the Alabama
judgment in Italy.
The Italian court of first instance refused to enforce the U.S.
judgment because it entailed an award of punitive damages - an
institution specific to common law systems and alien to civil law
countries like Italy.' In particular, although the Alabama decision did
not contain any explicit reference to punitive damages,5 the Venice
Court of Appeals laid out a list of factors that led it to believe that the
Alabama award was punitive in nature:6 (1) its lack of rationale,
which made it impossible to identify what kind of losses the American
court intended compensate;7 (2) the large amount of damages
awarded, along with the fact that such award could not be compared
to the sums already obtained by the plaintiff in the settlement
agreement with the other defendants;8 and (3) the particular
professional quality of the wrongdoer (a manufacturer).9
2. The court stated that the lack of rationale itself in a foreign judgment does
not conflict with a domestic public order. See Ostoni, supra note 1, at 258.
3. The Italian Code of Civil Procedure article 796 (Codice diprocedura civile)
vested the Intermediate Appellate Courts with the authority to decide whether a
foreign decision can be recognized and enforced in Italy as a case of first impression.
Here, the request for the recognition and enforcement of the Alabama decision in
Italy was first brought before the Court of Appeals of Venice [hereinafter "Court of
Appeals"]. In the instant case, the actual appellate. court is the Italian Supreme
Court, Suprema Corte di Cassazione, in Rome [hereinafter "Supreme Court"].
4. Punitive damages "are in contrast with public order," since in civil damages
actions (as well as in contract cases) "the civil law principles of our legal system
assume that compensation to the injured party shall be due based on the damages
that the party actually suffered." Corte app. Venezia, Parrot v. Fimez, 24 J.L. &
COM. at 261.
5. Id at 258.
6. Id. at 261.
7. "Due to the absence of a rationale, it is not possible to understand on which
grounds the amount was awarded, the nature of the damages recovered, and the
criteria to understand on which basis it was possible to recover damages." Id. at 259.
Moreover, the Venetian court found that it was unable to determine the rules and the
principles applied in determining the amount that the defendant was ordered to pay.
Id. at 259-60.
8. Id. at 262.
9. Id. at 262. "[A]II these elements suggest that the judgment against Fimez is a
[Vol. 31:2
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The decision of the Venetian court was then appealed, and the
case reached the Supreme Court (Suprema Corte di Cassazione).' °
The appellant sought reversal, arguing that the reasoning expressed
by the lower court - that the American court's judgment lacked
rationale for the punitive nature of damages - revealed an evident
logical contradiction: How can one extrapolate with certainty the
exact meaning of a statement if the statement itself is not clear?
Moreover, the appellant claimed the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that an award of punitive damages would be contrary to
domestic public policy. The appellant's argument was that the Italian
legal system does consist of different legal institutions, such as penalty
clauses and non-economic damages, that tended to punish the
wrongdoer through a payment of a sum of money to the victim.
With respect to the alleged inconsistency in the lower court's
reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the determination reached by
the Venetian court regarding the punitive nature of the Alabama
judgment was an issue of fact, and thus not subject to review by the
Supreme Court. As a matter of law, the Supreme Court is only
entitled to reinterpret the definition of domestic ordre public
rendered by the lower court and in the instant case such definition
revealed no fault. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of
Appeals' decision on the ground that it correctly ascertained that the
concept of punishment is alien to the award of civil damages in Italy
and that to this extent the wrongdoer's conduct is considered
irrelevant.
The Supreme Court further reasoned that the purpose of civil
damages is only to compensate the injured party for the losses
suffered, without exception. Consequently, the Supreme Court
struck down, one by one, each of the appellant's attempts to show
that there exist some legal institutions within the Italian system of
civil liability that pursue a punitive aim, that is to say, penalty clauses
and non-economic damages.
Citing some of its own earlier decisions," the Court emphasized
that the purpose of penalty clauses is not punishment. It stated that a
sanction, and that this sanction has been ordered for punitive and deterrent purposes
which are not within this legal system." Id.
10. For a translation of the Italian Supreme Court's decision, Cass., 19 jan. 2007,
n.1183, see infra Appendix A. The decision can be read, in Italian, in Corr. glur.,
2007, 4, 497 (with note by Pasquale Fava, Punitive damages e ordine pubblico: la
Cassazione blocca 1o sbarco).
11. See Cass., 30 jan. 2006, n.1877, Arch. Giur. Circ. 2007, 422.
2008]
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penalty clause serves to strengthen a contractual relationship and to
quantify damages beforehand.'2 The Court found its main evidence
against the punitive nature of penalty in article 1382 of the Civil
Code, which empowers a judge to downsize a manisfestly excessive
penalty.
13
Moreover, with respect to non-economic damages, the Supreme
Court reasoned that "no overlap exists between an award of moral
damages and the punitive damages doctrine."'4 In the Italian legal
12. See infra Appendix A, Translation.
13. See in the United States, Charles Calleros, Punitive Damages, Liquidated
Damages, and Clauses Penales in Contract Actions A Comparative Analysis of the
American Common Law and the French Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 115
(2006) (arguing that economic efficiency can be accomplished even if punitive
damages could be assessed for intentional breach of contract); William S. Dodge, The
Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 666 (1999) (analyzing the
different impact of "property rules" and "liability rules" on the protection of a legal
entitlement; proposing an efficiency-based reasoning according to which punitive
damages should be extended to any willful breach of contract); Ugo Mattei, The
Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP.
L. 427, 443 (1995) (discussing the origins and developments of different models of
penalty clauses, and identifying as ideological the reasons why legal systems in
general, and common law system in particular, are "so suspicious of penalties").
In Italy, the debate around public-policy limits on "private fines" is undoubtedly
open. See Pietro Perlingieri, Equilibrio Normativo e Principio diProporzionaliti nei
Contratti, in Rassegna di Diritto Civile, 2001, II, 334. Professor Perlingieri argues
that freedom of contract is neither a dogma nor a preconception nor a value in itself;
it is instead molded in accordance with the legal system as a whole, based on its
principles and rules. The so-called freedom of contract places itself "between
freedom and justice." Id at 335. On such premises, analyzing a landmark decision of
the EU Court of First Instance (April 30, 1998, n. 16/98, in R6c., 1998, II, p. 757),
Professor Perlingieri concludes that the principle of proportionality is fully in force in
the Italian system and it directly applies to contracts. Id at 340. See also ANDREA
ZOPPINI, LA PENA CONTRATrUALE 218 (1991) (maintaining that the subject-matter
of penalty clauses should not be limited to pecuniary performances, so long as such
different performance is susceptible of economic appraisal and rejecting the idea
according to which penalty clauses may be freely reduced by the court, absent the
parties' pleadings).
14. See infra Appendix A, Translation. The expression danni morali in Italian
(freely translated here as moral damages) can be read, for the purposes of this article,
as a synonym with pain and suffering awards. The history of the availability of such
awards in Italy, however, has not been steadfast. A quick overview may help. Art.
2059 of the Italian Civil Code states that non-economic damages can be awarded only
in those cases expressly provided by the law. Further, art. 2043 c.c., which can be
seen as the basic rule of civil liability within the Italian system, provides that "any
deed, intentional or negligent, that causes others unjust harm compels he [or her]
who did the deed to pay damages." Conspicuous is the literature developed around
the scope of the two rules and their alleged relationship of "mutual exclusion." See
Emanuela Navarretta, Danni Non Patrimoniali il Dogma Infranto e il Nuovo Diitto
[Vol. 31:2
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system pain and suffering awards are intimately linked to a loss
actually suffered by the person damaged, and their assessment is
closely anchored to that loss."
According to the Supreme Court, the amount of punitive
damages is calculated independently of the loss suffered by the
plaintiff. By contrast, the court continued, in Italy damages for pain
and suffering may only be awarded once the plaintiff has come
forward with evidence of a loss determined by the offense, resorting
to concrete, factual circumstances.
Therefore, over twenty years after the occurrence of the facts
that gave rise to the Fimez case in Alabama, the Italian Supreme
Court confirmed the Venetian Court's decision, and, by doing so,
ultimately fended punitive damages off the Italian system.
Vivente, Foro It. I 2003, 2276 (arguing that, while art. 2043 c.c. protects any interest
legally recognized, art. 2051 c.c., on the contrary, aside from those cases in which the
legislature itself explicitly provides for non economic damages, is intended to protect
only the inviolable rights of the person constitutionally protected); Id., I Danni Non
Patrimoniah" nella Responsabiliti Extracontrattuale, in Id (ed.) I Danni Non
Patrimoniali 33 ff. (Giuffr , Milan 2004); Pietro Perlingieri, L 'Art. 2059 c.c. Uno e
Bino: Una Interpretazione che Non Convince, in Rassegna di Diritto Civile, 2003 at
775 (maintaining that Article 2 of the Italian Republic's Constitution is directly
applicable, both vertically and horizontally, and therefore there is no need for it to be
explicitly recalled by rules of lower rank in the hierarchy of the sources of law - such
as art. 2051 c.c.); Carlo Castronovo, La Responsabilith Civile in Italia a] Passaggio a]
Nuovo Millennio, in Eur. dir. priv., 2003 at 141 (underlying that art. 2043 traces an
hypothesis of liability exhaustive in every of its elements, while art. 2059 draws only
an element of such hypothesis, that is the harm stemming from a violation non
susceptible of pecuniary quantification); Paolo Cendon, Danni Non Patrimonial"
Verso Dove Stiamo Andando, in Ugo Dal Lago & Raniero Bordon (eds.), La Nuova
Disciplina del Danno Non Patrimoniale 87 ff. (forecasting that art. 2059 c.c. will play
a smaller and smaller role, gradually leaving the floor to art. 2043 c.c., as the default
rule of the Italian system of civil liability).
15. There is a deep split in the Italian civil law scholarship with regard to the
nature of non-economic damages. In favor of their punitive function, and for
complete references to the state of the art in the literature, see M. GRAZIA
BARATELLA, LE PENE PRIVATE 88 (2006) (analyzing the development of the non-
economic-damage doctrine, especially under an historical perspective, and
maintaining, dissenting from the majority view endorsed by the Italian Supreme
Court, that moral damages bear a punitive function, analogous to the poenae ex
maleficio typical of classic Roman law. Id. at 187.). Cf FRANCESCO D. BUSNELLI
AND SALVATORE PATTI, DANNO E RESPONSABILITA CIvILE 246 (2003) (analyzing the
difference between crime and tort liability within common law systems, and
concluding that it is not legally possible to identify the function of non-economic
damages and that of punitive damages because the former tends to entirely
compensate the loss suffered by the injured party).
20081
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III. The Italian System of Civil Liability Does Not Seek
Punishment; Does the U. S. System? The Need for An
Overview of the Punitive Damages Doctrine
In the Fimez case, the Corte di Cassazione thus expelled the legal
institution of punitive damages from the Italian legal system. In
doing so, the court specified that the domestic system of civil liability
does not seek punishment for the wrongdoer's misconduct but only
compensates the injured party for the losses suffered. 6 The court
limited its analysis to the parties' pleadings, thereby avoiding having
to provide its judgment in a systematic framework. 7
In the United States, the distinction between the law of torts and
criminal law lies on the postulation that the former "does not
condemn, but only shifts the economic burdens of loss."'"
The literature on punitive damages in the United States is
16. Confront, however, the opinion delivered by the Italian Corte Costituzionale
in different occasions: for instance, see Corte cost., 14 jul. 1986, n.184, Foro It. I 1986,
2053 (with note by Giulio Ponzanelli); and Corte cost., 30 dec. 1987, n. 641, Foro It. I
1988, 1057 (with note by Giulio Ponzanelli) (both maintaining that the system of civil
liability can as well take up tasks of retribution and prevention).
17. In 2003 the Supreme Court brought into being two landmark decisions in the
field of "existential" damages, as a category distinct from that of "moral" and
"biological" damages, and, unlike the instant case, the court did not hesitate to set a
precedent through a thorough analysis of the systematic background. Cass., 31 may
2003, n.8827, Foro It. I 2003, 2273, and Cass., 31 may 2003, n.8828, Foro It. I 2003,
2272. Against the necessity of implementing the new "existential damages" category,
see Marco Rossetti, L'Inutilith del Danno Esistenziale, in IL RISARCIMENTO
INTEGRALE SENZA IL DANNO EsISTENZIALE 77 (Giulio Ponzanelli ed., 2007). Other
Authors, on the contrary, stood up for the validity and usefulness of the said
category: see Paolo Cendon, Non di Sola Salute Vive l'Uomo, in STUDI RESCIGNO, V
139 (1999) and Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Alle Soglie di una Nuova Categoria
Risarcitoria: il Danno Esistenziale, in DANNO RESP. 6 (1999).
18. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 6 (2007). See also, PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 26 (1984) (recognizing that,
although punishment and retaliation may be an important aim of the law in assessing
damages, "it is not often mentioned in the award of compensatory damages, which
usually are treated by the courts as a mere adjustment of the loss which has occurred
in accordance with responsibility. To the extent that punitive damages are given,
however, both prevention and retaliation become accepted objects of the
administration of the law of torts."). For a review of literature claiming tort
damages' main goal is deterrence, and not compensation, see Richard Craswell,
Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135, 1177
(2003) (arguing "that the idea of compensation plays a very different role in
economic theories than in theories of corrective justice. Specifically, while
compensation is foundational to the very idea of corrective justice, compensation is
only incidentally connected (if it is even connected at all) with economic welfare").
[Vol. 31:2
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extensive. Nevertheless, even in 2007, there are still those who feel
the need to call attention to the widespread lack of systematic insight
towards the punitive damages doctrine. 9
In order to make a reasoned prediction on whether the feasibility
of recognition of punitive damages awards in Italy is really as remote
as the Corte di Cassazione made it appear in the Fimez case,' it is
important to observe the development of the punitive damages
doctrine." A historical analysis is useful to determine the way in
which American scholars have tackled this controversial issue at the
border between civil and criminal liability.
IV. Purpose of Punitive Damages in the United States: Full
Compensation of Plaintiff or Punishment of Defendant?
Punitive damages received their first statutory recognition in
England in 12752' and their first actual award in common law history
19. "[A]lthough there is no crisis in punitive-damages litigation, there was, and
still is, a crisis in punitive-damages theory." Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages.-
From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 960 (2007). Conclusively, Professor
Sebok argues that, "[i]f we recognize that [punitive damages] fit within a scheme of
civil recourse and provide a unique form of redress where citizens have suffered the
indignity of a willful violation of their private rights, then we will have a theory of
punitive damages that reflects the reality of the tort system we actually have." Id. at
1036.
20. See infra Appendix A, Translation.
21. For a historical survey on punitive damages, see Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982)
(tracing English history of punitive damages awards); Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990)
(discussing early punitive damage awards in England and United States); David G.
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257,
1262 (1976) (tracing deep roots of punitive damages in ancient law); Michael Rustad
& Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards.-
Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1284 (1993) (tracing origins
and development of the punitive damages doctrine).
The following functions have been attributed to punitive damages in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries: (1) compensation for insult (distinct from emotional
distress); (2) personal vindication; (3) vindication of the state; (4) exemplary
punishment; and (5) general deterrence. Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive
Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters
Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 197 (2003).
22. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early
Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1996); David Friedman, Beyond the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 103 (1996). See infra note 43.
23. The first English provision for multiple damages was enacted by Parliament
in 1275: "Trespassers against religious persons shall yield double damages." Synopsis
2008]
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in 1763.24 In early English cases, their purpose was aimed to punish
and deter abuses of official authority.
Among the common law countries that have traditionally utilized
punitive damages in civil lawsuits, the most widespread use is in the
United States.' Even though both scholarship and case law have
almost unanimously deemed punishment and deterrence, together, as
the main goals of punitive damages,26 the debate around the factors to
be used by the courts in determining their amount, as well as their
nature and purpose,27 has been exceptionally lively since the doctrine
of Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw., c. 1 (Eng.),, quoted in David G. Owen, Punitive
Damages Overview" Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 368
(1994).
24. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763) (awarding £300 in damages,
even though actual damages amounted to only £20, in an action for illegitimate
seizure of publishers and printers) and Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763)
(awarding exemplary damages and discussing the power of the Secretary of State and
his agents to perform searches under general warrants).
25. See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages.- A Comparative Analysis, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 421 (2004) (conducting a comparative study of
punitive damages in five countries: Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and
the United States).
26. For a virtual synthesis of the two positions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908(1) (1977): "Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or
nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct
and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future." For a
limited focus on California, see Cal. Civ. Code §3294(a) (2007) which provides that,
"[iln an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
(Emphasis added). The most recent developments in the case law clearly show that
compensation is not the justification for punitive-damages awards. See, Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). See also infra
note 39 and section 4.
27. See Judge Posner, delivering the Court's opinion in Mathias v. Accor
Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003): punitive damages chiefly pursue
purposes of deterrence, by "limiting the defendant's ability to profit from its fraud by
escaping detection and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is 'caught' only half the
time... then when he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to
make up for the times he gets away." Id. at 677. See also, Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d
33, 34-35 (7th Cir. 1996) (the underdeterrence provided by compensatory damages is
a reason for punitive damages). Further, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: an Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 954 (1998), who
propose "a simple formula for calculating punitive damages, according to which harm
is multiplied by a factor reflecting the likelihood of escaping liability. If punitive
damages are calculated according to this multiplier formula, precautions will tend to
be optimal . . . as will product prices and the incentive to participate in risky
activities." But cf E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate
[Vol. 31:2
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first appeared in the United States.'
At least six objectives have been identified for imposing punitive
damages: (1) punishing the wrongdoer; (2) deterring the wrongdoer
and others from committing similar offenses; (3) preserving the
peace; (4) inducing private law enforcement; (5) compensating
victims for an otherwise non-compensable loss; and (6) paying the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees.29
In the United States, a line of scholarship considers the most
important aspect of punitive damages to be to compensate plaintiffs.
If this were true, it would follow that the view expressed by the Italian
Supreme Court in Fimezis incorrect and ought to be revised.
It has been argued that "[s]ince at least one-third of the
plaintiff's recovery ordinarily is spent for legal fees, a verdict that
does not include a sum for these expenses almost always leaves the
plaintiff substantially worse off financially than he was before the
accident."' Furthermore, it has been argued that a substantial part of
a plaintiff's losses, especially that involving intangible harm, cannot
be compensated under the ordinary rules of compensatory damage
liability.3 Accordingly, punitive damages may be seen as a mere
adjustment necessary to fully compensate victims in response to the
assumption that compensatory damages as defined by the courts are
insufficient to make the plaintiff completely whole. Also, some
scholars, citing case law, have argued "the legal revenge provided by
punitive damages helps restore the plaintiff's emotional equilibrium
Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1056-57 (1989) (arguing that "punitive
damages awards against corporations may actually have the perverse effects of
decreasing economic incentives for safety, undermining individual responsibility, and
encouraging business-as-usual by corporations").
28. Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6 (Courts of Common Pleas and General Sessions
of the Peace of South Carolina, 1784); Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (N.J. 1791).
See also Justice Timlin of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W.
18, 20 (Wis. 1914). For an overview of the earliest cases in America, see Owen, supra
note 21, at 1262.
29. Ellis, Jr., supra note 21, at 3.
30. Owen, supra note 21, at 1297. The author reasoned that "awards of punitive
damages tend to alleviate, however imprecisely, the rigors of the American rule,"
which "unequivocally prohibits awards of attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory
authorization."
It should be noted, however, that in Italy it is generally accepted that the party losing
at trial has to pay for its counterpart's legal fees.
31. Owen, supra note 23, at 378 (concluding that "[ilt seems self-evident that a
defendant who has intentionally or wantonly injured another may fairly be required
to make the plaintiff truly whole again").
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and in this way compensates him for the psychological harm caused
by the defendant's malicious act.,
32
This paper is not intended to establish whether the doctrine of
punitive damages in the United States is right or wrong,33 efficient or
detrimental;34 rather, it is aimed to research the overall logic, if any,35
of such a doctrine within its own legal environment. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that in the above-mentioned situations (plaintiffs
recovering, through an award of punitive damages, for their otherwise
non-compensable economic and non-economic losses) something is
32. Owen, supra note 21, at 1296. Some courts have held punitive damages are
awarded also as "vindication of private right." Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 437
(S.C. 1965). On the inadmissibility of revenge-based remedies in "civilized" legal
systems, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS. A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 293-300 (1970).
33. See Ellen Wertheimer, Punitive Damages and Strict Products Liability. An
Essay in Oxymoron, 39 VILL. L. REV. 505, 507 (1994) (suggesting that the primary
focus of tort damages "should lie with their compensatory function. Because the
ability of subsequent plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages may depend on the
manufacturer remaining solvent, punitive damages are a luxury that courts should
avoid awarding in order to protect the broader-based right of all claimants to
compensatory payment.").
34. For a discussion on "America's declining international competitiveness," see
Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr., Limiting Punitive Damages.- A Placebo for America's Ailing
Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S L. J. 197 (1992).
35. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting): "Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with
restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed
indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for harm. Regrettably,
common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into the latter category."
See also, the radical position expressed in Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews,
Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 52 (2004) (arguing
that "the very existence of punitive damages, as the concept currently exists, should
be held unconstitutional." Indeed, "by vesting coercive public power in self-
interested private actors, the concept of punitive damages upsets the delicate balance
between public and private authority that grows out of the essential precepts of
liberal democratic theory."). See also, Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of
Justice through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1573, 1637
(1997) (calling for a federal tort reform legislation on the grounds that the increase in
the magnitude and frequency of punitive damages warrants "closer scrutiny of the
doctrine and the introduction of safeguards to protect American industry from
abusive penalties. When punitive damage sanctions are awarded in excessive
amounts or are imposed erratically against undeserving defendants, the tort system as
a whole is undermined"). See also Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U.L.
REV. 559, 564 (1992) (highlighting that punitive damages "generate
disproportionately high awards in a random and capricious manner") and Jane
Mallor & Barry S. Roberts, Punitive Damages.- On the Path to A Principled
Approach?, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 648 (1980) (maintaining that, "[b]etter still would
be to remove the jury from the assessment of the punitive award").
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strikingly absent. Such inconsistency may be found either in U.S. tort
law or, in all likelihood, in the very heart of those theories placing
compensation amongst the purposes of punitive damages awards.
In American tort law there exist several effective responses to
plaintiffs' claims as far as recovery for intangible losses is concerned.36
It has also been argued that "compensating some plaintiffs for
otherwise uncompensable losses or attorneys' fees may be viewed,
not as justification for, but as a byproduct of punitive damages. 37
It is generally accepted that punitive damages have nothing to do
with making the plaintiff whole.3' The U.S. Supreme Court has on
36. Even though jurisdictional splits are still present, witnessing the existence of
different approaches in assessing non-economic damages, it has been noted that,
"[t]he more a society develops (in economic terms), the greater the amount of
resources it spends in recognition of 'new' interests and the greater the demand for
legal recognition will be." Giovanni Comandd, Towards a Global Model for
Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages. Bridging Europe and the United States, 19
TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 241, 250-51 (2005). Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of
Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2403, 2409 (2000) ("In 1900,
misfortune was a more accepted part of life. Today, people are more willing to blame
others for their injuries and go to court to obtain redress.").
37. Ellis, Jr., supra note 21, at 11, who concludes that the justifications offered for
punitive damages "can be reduced to two: (1) that wrongdoers deserve punishment,
beyond that provided by reparative damages; and (2) that imposing a detriment on
defendants promotes efficiency by deterring loss-creating conduct." Id.
38. See Redish & Mathews, supra note 35, at 2 (holding that "punitive damages
in no way purport to compensate private victims for any loss they have suffered,
either measurable or immeasurable"); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business:
Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation
Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 981 (2001)
("Punitive damages are not an entitlement of the victims, but of society: a punitive
damages award is a civil punishment visited upon defendants to vindicate the public
interest in deterrence, and to penalize conduct that violates the social contract and
injures society."); Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Constitutional
Restraints on the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 907, 918 (1990)
("Punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence by a
system which simultaneously compensates the victim for his injury, and punishes the
defendant for the wrong done to society by his conduct."); Keeton et al., supra note
18, at 9 (affirming that punitive damages are given to the plaintiff "over and above
full compensation for the injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of
teaching the defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others from following the
defendant's example."); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 35, bottom (arguing that
punishment and deterrence cannot be separated as purposes for punitive damages
and that punishment for past acts affects future conduct). Among early U.S.
common law, confront the opinion delivered by Justice Foster of the New Hampshire
S.C., in Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 343 (1873) ("Damage ... is derived from demo, to
take away; and therefore it is not derived from punio, to punish." Punitive damages
are "a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming
the symmetry of the body of the law." Id. at 382).
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several occasions stated that the purpose of punitive damages is not
to compensate the plaintiff for injury but to punish the defendant.39
That is also demonstrated by the fact that the U.S. Congress has
ascertained that, "[p]unitive damages are intended to punish the
wrongdoer and do not compensate the claimant for lost wages or pain
and suffering."'  It can be argued that by using punitive damages to
increase compensation in cases where punitive damages are not
required, courts would be awarding compensatory damages twice; in
those cases, it would seem desirable to expand the scope of
compensatory damages." On the other hand, one further question
39. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (punitive damages "are
not compensation for injury" but "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"), quoted in Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453
U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) ("Punitive damages by definition are not intended to
compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful
action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme
conduct"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (The "focus" of punitive damages
"is on the character of the tortfeasor's conduct-whether it is of the sort that calls for
deterrence and punishment over and above that provided by compensatory
awards."); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) ("Punitive damages
are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) ("It should be presumed a plaintiff has
been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages
should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid
compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further
sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence"); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127
S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition." Nonetheless, "the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to
use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties." Id. at 1063). The latter opinion is also significant for what it "did not
hold: the Court declined to consider the question of whether the $79.5 million award.
• .was unconstitutionally excessive under State Farm. Therefore, the issue of
whether a jury may award punitive damages in excess of a 9-1 ratio when there is
particularly culpable conduct remains unsettled." Kendyl T. Hanks, Philip Morris
further limitspunitive damages, 16 Bus. L. TODAY 10 (2007).
40. H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143 (1996): "Punitive damages received on account
of personal injury or sickness whether or not related to a physical injury or physical
sickness" are considered a windfall for plaintiffs and, thus, taxable gross income. See
26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(1)(West 2002), which does not apply to punitive damages
awarded in a civil wrongful death action. 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(c)(1) (West 2002). For
an analysis of the impact of this reform on trial strategies, see infra sections 6 and 7.
41. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 27, at 939: "Although we recognize that
awarding punitive damages as a substitute for a missing component of harm has a
potential rationale in terms of assuring proper deterrence, we suggest ... that
remedies for missing components of harm would be best pursued through revision of
the rules to calculate compensatory damages."
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which leaves the debate about the compensatory nature of punitive
damages somewhat open is why plaintiffs continue to be the sole
beneficiaries of the whole punitive damages award" while, in any
other segment of the legal system in case of punishment, fines
generally go to the community latu sensu.4 3 What is it that makes
punitive damages different from criminal sanctions? On the
assumption that punitive damages do not compensate plaintiffs -
even in a minimal part - and that their major purpose is deterrence,
some authors have then proposed to "give only the compensatory
part to the plaintiff" and the remainder to other public institutions."
V. Punitive Damages at the Border Between
Criminal Law and Private Law
With this in mind, the boundaries between punitive damages and
criminal sanctions need to be clarified. 5
42. "Exemplary or punitive damages go to the plaintiff, not as a fine or penalty
for a public wrong, but in vindication of a private right which has been willfully
invaded; and, indeed, it may be said that such damages in a measure compensate or
satisfy for the willfulness with which the private right was invaded, but, in addition
thereto, operating as a deterring punishment to the wrongdoer, and as a warning to
others." Watts v. South Bound R. Co., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901). See also, Daniel
M. Weddle, A Practitioner's Guide to Litigating Punitive Damages After BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 662 (1999) ("[P]unitive damages
are meant to provide a public remedy for a public wrong rather than an individual
remedy."). Moreover, punitive damages "motivate reluctant victims to press their
claims and enforce the rules of law." Owen, supra note 23, at 380.
43. "The idea of punishment, or of discouraging other offenses, usually does not
enter into tort law.... Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always
required for punitive damages." Keeton et al., supra note 18. According to Professor
Friedman, supra note 22, at 110 (fn. 32), "[i]n a system in which the state received any
excess damages instead of the victim, it would be in the joint interest of plaintiff and
defendant to settle, thus eliminating the payment to the state. Preventing such
agreements would require substantial changes in civil procedure designed to reduce
the plaintiff's control over the case." The favorability of a system based on private
prosecution, through the so-called bounty system, rather than prosecution by the
state has been found in the circumstance that "advocacy by government attorneys
must be tempered by the "neutrality" that comes with their recognition of their
special obligation to the public interest, above and beyond their role as advocates."
Redish & Mathews, supra note 35, at 45 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. b (2000)).
44. E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages.: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 839, 880 (1993).
45. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 163-64 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that, from an economic point of view, the purpose of criminal law is to
impose additional costs on unlawful behavior where the conventional remedies
would be inadequate to limit that behavior to the optimal level). See also Kenneth
20081
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting from the majority in Browning-
Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,4 stated that
punitive damages imposed on defendants constitute "a fine subject to
the limitations of the Eighth Amendment. 47 In spite of her vehement
attempt to extend the Excessive Fine clause to punitive damages
awards, the majority in Browning-Ferris established that the Eighth
Amendment was inapplicable to money damage awards in civil suits.'
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,49 the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that a grossly excessive punitive damages
award might violate substantive due process constraints but declined
to set forth a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.0
Consequently, the Court upheld a punitive damages award that
exceeded the plaintiff's actual damages by over five hundred times. 1
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore represented a turning
point in the history of punitive damages. For the first time, the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned a punitive damages award by reason of its
excessiveness (500 times the amount of the actual harm)." Although
it refused, once again, to put forward a clear formula, the Court set
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1844 (1992) (analyzing reasons and implications of the growing
role of punitive civil sanctions).
46. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989). In Italy,
published in Foro It., 1990, IV, c. 174 (note by, Maria Silvia Romano, DanniPunitivi
ed Eccesso di Deterrenza: gli (Incerti) Argini Costituzionah).
47. Id. at 297 (1989). In Browning-Ferris the majority held that no due process
claims - either procedural or substantive - were properly presented and that, due
to peculiarities of the case before the court, the award of punitive damages should
not be overturned as a matter of federal common law. Moreover, at the time it was
drafted and ratified, "the primary focus of the Eighth Amendment was the potential
for governmental abuse of its "prosecutorial" power, not concern with the extent or
purposes of civil damages." Id. at 266. However, because private actors are
permitted "to determine and foster their own interests, untied to some broader
notion of the public interest," it is "wholly inappropriate and unwise to place purely
public coercive power in their hands." Redish & Mathews, supra note 35, at 52
(challenging the constitutionality of the whole concept of punitive damages).
48. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263-64. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
664 (1977) (limiting Eighth Amendment to criminal setting).
49. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). For
a discussion of this case, see Giulio Ponzanelli, Non c'l Due Senza Tre: la Corte
Suprema Usa Salva Ancora i Danni Punitivi, Foro It. IV 1994, 92.
50. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458.
51. Id. at 451.
52. Higher punitive damages "may... be justified in cases in which the injury is
hard to detect," or where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages." Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
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forth three guideposts to determine the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award. 3 The Court's reasoning in Gore established the
foundation for all subsequent punitive damages awards.'
The U.S. Supreme Court, when called on to elaborate on the
nature and purpose of punitive damages, has had difficulties fitting
the practice of punitive damages into the concept of civil fines or
penalties." In 2001, the Supreme Court seemed to arrive at an
epochal turning point, 6 when it acknowledged that punitive damages
are like criminal punishments set by legislatures because they "reflect
moral judgments."57  This could have meant that all constitutional
guarantees provided for the accused in criminal proceedings should
automatically be extended to civil litigants facing punitive damages.
Two years later, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, the
Court maintained that punitive damages "serve the same purposes as
criminal penalties"58 and, at the same time, stated that great care must
be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal penalties,
which should be imposed only after the heightened protections of a
criminal trial have been observed - including its higher standards of
proof.5 9
In an attempt to put forth a clearer distinction between the
concept of punishment in civil and criminal actions, some authors
have proposed describing punitive damages as private punishment,'
53. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-77. (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.
54. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428.
55. "Punitive damages are not compensation but private fines to punish and
deter." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974). See also, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979); and, especially, Browning-Ferris, 492
U.S. at 297 (O'Connor, J., citing Supreme Court cases recognizing criminal law
nature of punitive damages).
56. See Leatherman, 532 U.S. at 433.
57. Sebok, supra note 21, at 168.
58. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
59. Id at 428.
60. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REv. 583, 636
(2003). ("The historical understanding of punitive damages was that they punish the
purely private wrong to the victim and, in so doing, also benefit the public, but the
public benefit is, in a sense, a welcome incidental effect of the private punishment.")
(Emphasis added).
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while others have argued that a plaintiff in a private lawsuit "does not
punish wrongdoing in a way that resembles punishment by the
state."6' Moreover, some studies have shown that, even "if egregious
and morally shocking civil wrongs were criminalized, such cases
would seldom be prosecuted 6 2 due to the exceptionally burdensome
investigatory process peculiar to the criminal system.63 The punitive
damages system, by contrast, proves more efficient than prosecution
by the state because it "provides injured parties and their lawyers
with financial incentives to do all of the investigation themselves. '
At this point, it seems clear (and case law confirms) that punitive
damages pursue a retaliatory function, which, for the purposes of
this article, is sufficient to place them outside the picture drawn by
the Italian Supreme Court in the Fmez case.
VI. The Law and Economics Multiplier: the Optimal Level
of Damages Tends to Equal the Harm Done
Consider a passage of a renowned law and economics article:
"[p]unitive damages.., should be set at a level such that the expected
damages of defendants equal the harm they have caused, for then
their damage payment will, in an average sense, equal the harm."66
That is, punitive damages should be determined according to the
following formula: let P be the probability of being found liable and
the probability to escape liability equal (1 - P). The multiplier then
equals (1-P)/P. 67 In other words, if the probability of escaping liability
61. Sebok, supra note 19, at 1006.
62. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1441 (1993).
63. Id. at 1440 (underlying that "punitive damages are the only practical method
of exercising social control over economically formidable offenders, especially
organizational offenders." And that "[a] crucial function of punitive damages is to
provide financial incentives for private parties to enforce the law - the bounty
system." Id at 1451).
64. Id. at 1441.
65. Punitive damages "are not awarded to compensate for injury, but rather to
further the aims of the criminal law." Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486
U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part with the judgment). See also
Redish & Mathews, supra note 35, at 33 ("Punitive damages, freed from their
historical moorings in the compensatory form of exemplary damages, do not
compensate the private plaintiff for actual harm suffered.").
66. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 27, at 954 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 962, n.274.
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is 50 percent, then a jury is expected to assess punitive damages by
multiplying compensatory damages by one; if the probability is 80
percent, then the multiplier would be four; if 90 percent, the
multiplier would be nine; and so forth.'
The reality, however, has proven to be rather different from the
one suggested by the aforementioned economic analysis of punitive
damages. So far, no court has based its reasoning on this formula
(see, in particular, the exceptional amount of punitive damages at
stake in the Exxon Valdez case69). Nevertheless, assuming that this
was the official trend in the United States in assessing punitive
damages, and supposing also that a verdict of that kind was brought
before an Italian court for recognition and enforcement, would such a
judgment have a better chance than that in the Fimezcase?
Even though an award thus obtained would, "in an average
sense," 70 equal the harm done, the Italian system of civil liability is not
yet prepared to grant it recognition. To this end, courts will continue
to focus on the sphere of the injured party, notwithstanding the
defendant's (mis)conduct or wealth.71 On the contrary, in the United
States, it is well established that the determining factor in assessing
punitive damages is the overall position of the wrongdoer.72
68. For a different approach to a multiplier formula, depending upon the
existence of statutory caps to punitive damages (thus reducing the enforcement
probability), see Galanter & Luban, supra note 62, at 1451.
69. In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
70. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 27.
71. Infra Appendix A, Translation, penultimate paragraph.
72. See Punitive damages.: relationship to defendant's wealth as factor in
determining propriety ofa ward, 87 A.L.R. 4th 141 (Originally published in 1991). To
illustrate, the California Supreme Court has established that, "[p]unitive damages are
to be assessed in an amount which, depending upon the defendant's financial worth
and other factors, will deter him and others from committing similar misdeeds.
Because compensatory damages are designed to make the plaintiff 'whole,' punitive
damages are a 'windfall' form of recovery." College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court,
8 Cal. 4th 704, 712 (1994). Cf Kelly v. Haag, 145 Cal. App. 4th 910 (2006) (reversing
a punitive-damages award for lack of evidence of the defendant's financial
condition). However, it has been argued that, in order to establish optimal levels of
deterrence, punitive damages should be linked to the wealth of defendant only when
the wrongdoers are "individuals whose benefit from causing harm is socially illicit,"
that is, for conducts "whose goal is to cause harm." Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 27,
at 914 (emphasis added).
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VII. Recent Trends in the United States Courts: Shifting
From Punitive Damages to Pain and Suffering Awards
Having observed that punitive damages do not pursue
compensatory goals, it is now interesting to examine the surprising
escalation in the United States of multi-million-dollar pain and
suffering awards. These awards, ostensibly, seem to have established
a convenient alternative to punitive damages.
Since Congress, in 1989, provided that, unlike compensatory
damages, punitive damages are taxable gross income,73 plaintiffs'
attorneys have "poured new wine of punishment evidence, once used
to obtain punitive damages, into old bottles of pain and suffering
awards. ,14
For example, consider that in 2001 a Los Angeles jury set forth a
verdict of over $55 million in a tire separation case, of which $41
million of the damages awarded were for non-economic damages.75
Surprisingly, no punitive damages were awarded. Also in 2001, a
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action was awarded $115 million;
$100 million of which was for pain and suffering.76 The same year in
Mississippi, in two separate cases, juries awarded multi-million-dollar
verdicts for plaintiffs based almost exclusively on pain and suffering,
whereas out-of-pocket damages amounted to a sum significantly
below the overall award.77
73. See supra note 40. See also, Margaret L. Thum, Note, Confusion in the
courts." Failure to Tax Punitive Damages Uniformly in Personal Injury Cases, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591, 614 (1996) (underscoring the judiciary's failure to
uniformly apply tax laws due to inconsistent interpretations of tax statutes).
74. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and
Suffering A wards., Turning Compensation into "Punishment, " 54 S.C.L. REV. 47, 49
(2002).
75. Id. at 64 n.90 (referring to Lampe v. Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., No. BC 173567,
slip op. at 6 (L.A. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2001), which eventually settled for an
undisclosed sum.).
76. Id. at 65 n. 99 (referring to Evans v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Brooklyn, No.
4038/91, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Co. Super. Ct. (Nov. 9, 2001))).
77. In the first case, the award amounted to $100 million in compensatory
damages to ten plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the makers of a heartburn drug. See
Nation's First Rezulin Trial Ends in Settlement, 6-22 MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS
AND DEVICES 15, 19 (2001) (discussing Rankin v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No.
2000-20 (Miss. Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, Sept. 29, 2001)). In the second case, the
jury awarded $150 million in compensatory damages to six plaintiffs who claimed
they were purely exposed to asbestos, while no actual injuries had occurred. See
Miss. Jury Returns $150M Verdict Against A C&S, Dresser Industries, 3M Corp., 16-
19 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, 1, 4 (2001). Both cases are studied in Schwartz
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Because punitive damages were not awarded in any of those
cases, the risk of the improper use of pain and suffering aimed to fully
replace punitive damages is patently high." Consequently, it should
be noted that pain and suffering damages "are intended to
compensate the plaintiff for past and future pain and suffering and
anguish. They should not be twisted into a covert punitive damages
substitute and provide the next oil well for 'jackpot justice. ' ' 9
VIII. Punitive Damages Disguised as Pain and Suffering: A
Misleading Pathway Towards the Recognition of U.S.
Punitive Damages Awards
A central passage of a 2007 Italian Supreme Court decision
describes the mainstream trend in the Italian courts in dealing with
non-economic damages: "[iun the case of [non-pecuniary] damages...
the stress falls on the plaintiff, not on the wrongdoer: the primary
purpose of this category of damages is to compensate the plaintiff."
8
What opinion would an Italian court deliver if called upon to
recognize and enforce a multi-million-dollar "pain and suffering"
award similar to those mentioned in the last section? As seen in the
Fimez case, the Court of Appeals of Venice rejected the Alabama
award even though it did not contain any explicit reference to
punitive damages." The Court of Appeals of Venice gathered from
both the personal characteristics of defendant and the vagueness of
the Alabama judgment's rationale, that the award was punitive in
nature.
In dealing with cases such as the aforementioned,"' where
damages were awarded under the label of "pain and suffering," the
enforcing judge could be led into error. Since pain and suffering
awards in the United States are traditionally meant to compensate the
injured party for non-economic losses, and because in Italy, especially
& Lorber, supra note 74, at 65.
78. Such recent development has been considered dangerous on the ground that
pain and suffering awards lack constitutional and legal guideposts. See Schwartz &
Lorber, supra note 74, at 59.
79. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 74, at 68. Schwartz and Lorber conclude that
"[t]he trend of using pain and suffering damages to 'punish' can be stopped in its
tracks if judges do the job they have taken an oath to do." Id. at 70.
80. Infra Appendix A, Translation.
81. Ostoni, supra note 1, at 258.
82. Supra Section 6.
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after 2003,83 damages for pain and suffering enjoy full judicial
recognition, Italian courts will be prone to enforce foreign judgments
of this kind.
Following the analysis proposed by Professors Schwartz and
Lorber, it should be emphasized that such "pain and suffering"
awards unmistakably play a punitive role, in spite of the
nomenclature used. Hence, a foreign court should use a rather
skeptical approach when evaluating whether to recognize and enforce
such judgments.
Judging which of the legal systems is better or produces more
efficient outcome is not the purpose of this paper.Y This is not the job
of a comparative study, which should instead focus on the specificities
of the different legal systems one intends to examine.85 The purpose
of mentioning this recent trend in the U.S. legal system, by
underscoring its ambiguity with regard to punitive damages, is to
suggest that an enforcing court should go beyond the structural
appearances of foreign judgments and question their authentic
function."
83. The gist of the two decisions (supra note 16) is that, in the Italian legal
system, based on the Constitution and, especially, on Article Two (which recognizes
and protects all inviolable human rights), non-economic damages must be seen as a
broad category, comprehensive of any circumstance in which a value linked to the
human being has been damaged, and must go beyond the category of "moral
damages" (that is, non-economic losses arising from criminal offenses).
84. For an efficiency-based analysis of punitive damages in the United States, see
David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 853 (2002), which noted that efficient deterrence
"is achieved by threatening ...defendant with damages equal to the aggregate
tortious loss." See also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 27, at 954 ("Punitive damages
should be imposed when deterrence otherwise would be inadequate because of the
possibility that injurers would escape liability.") and Calabresi, supra note 32, at 135
("[T]he system would allocate the costs to those acts or activities that an arbitrary
initial bearer of accident costs would (in absence of transaction and information
costs) find it more worthwhile to 'bribe' in order to obtain that modification of
behavior which would lessen accident costs most.").
85. See RODOLFO SAcco, LA COMPARAISON JURIDIQUE AU SERVICE DE LA
CONNAISSANCE DU DROIT 8 (1991) ("La comparaison suppose dvidemment
l'observation de plusieurs modules juridiques, mais elle d6passe cette simple
observation ... consiste A mesurer les differences existant entre plusieurs modules
juridiques."); see also UGO MATrEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICs 69 (6th ed.
2004) (underlying the importance of a comparative study in order to shed light, both
in the United States and in Europe, on the contingency and relativity of the
respective national legal models).
86. A solution to an indiscriminate use of pain suffering in the United States is
that jurors be instructed "they are not to consider any alleged 'guilt' or 'misconduct'
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IX. Conclusion: Why Enforcing Courts Should
Avoid Unfair Total Rejections of U. S. Punitive
Damages Awards
On top of the controversial nature of the punitive damages
doctrine itself, the fact that the United States is not a party to any
international agreement governing the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments87 further complicates the picture.' For its part,
the Italian Supreme Court's rationale in Fimez is not without its
flaws.8 9
First, in upholding the Venice Court of Appeals' decision in the
of the defendant when setting noneconomic damages." Schwartz & Lorber, supra
note 75, at 69.
87. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreement, June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294, available at <http://www.hcch.netl
index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98> (visited February 2, 2008); see, Yoav
Oestreicher, The Rise and Fall of the "Mixed" and "Double" Convention Models
Regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 339, 355-56 (2007) (proposing a model that promotes a
"presumption of enforceability" rule in the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments "with very broad exceptions, such as: public policy, due process of law,
and jurisdiction." Id. at 341). See also, ALAN REED, ANGLO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 550 (2003) (analyzing the role of
the Brussels Convention within the European Union as a guarantee for the
defendant); Julie E. Dowler, Forging Finality.- Searching for a Solution to the
International Double-Suit Dilemma, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 391 (1994)
(underscoring that, because of the inexistence of international agreements on the
point, "there is no guarantee that United States judgments will be recognized or
enforced abroad").
88. Insofar as civil law countries other than Italy are concerned, the trend is in
the same direction: courts do not show much sympathy for punitive damages. See
John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages.- Is the Tide
Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (2007) (discussing a number of
developments outside of the United States concerning punitive damages, such as the
proposed revisions to the civil code in France, which would allow the awarding of
punitive damages in civil actions, and court decisions in Australia, Canada and Spain
enforcing American awards of punitive damages) and Volker Behr, Enforcement of
United States Money Judgments in Germany, 13 J.L. & COM. 211, 231 (1994)
(analyzing the position of the German Supreme Court: "Although punitive and
exemplary damages are an aspect of private law, and not criminal law, an award of
punitive and exemplary damages is fundamentally contrary to German public policy
even in enforcement cases."). For a practical approach to the subject, see ROBERT.
E. LUTZ, A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 427 (2007) (focusing on the civil law Exequatur).
89. See also supra notes 15 and 16 (and accompanying text).
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Fimezcase,90 the Italian Supreme Court confirmed the rejection of the
Alabama judgment despite the absence, in its rationale, of a plain
reference to punitive damages. Under the domestic rules of both civil
procedure and private international law, such a choice is wholly
legitimate and, as the Italian Supreme Court maintained, it is a matter
of fact, which should be tackled on a case-by-case basis.
Consequently, the Court held that punitive damages conflict with
domestic ordre public, thus rejecting the entire Alabama judgment
and the whole doctrine it allegedly set forth. Astonishingly, however,
it did not consider that part of the Alabama award might also provide
for compensatory damages. The issue at stake here is whether a court
has the power to reject a foreign money judgment, which
undoubtedly contains a compensatory fraction,91 simply because (the
determination of) part of it is deemed contrary to domestic public
policy. Total denial is not the only available answer - in truth, it is
the least appropriate one. Given that the defendant has no assets
within the reach of the foreign court, as a result of the rejection of the
entire judgment the plaintiff will recover nothing from the
manufacturer of the item that contributed to her son's death. If, on
the one hand, it is credible for the court to state that punitive
damages are contrary to a generic notion of domestic public policy,
on the other hand total rejection of the Alabama judgment could be
seen as a denial of justice.
Second, the Corte di Cassazione in Fimez failed to analyze in
depth the nature of the Alabama award. Its lack of rationale aside,
the Court should have been solicited by one of the parties (the one
with the greatest interest in the recognition of the Alabama judgment
perhaps) that punitive damages cannot be awarded by a United States
90. See supra notes 6-9 (and accompanying text).
91. It should be kept in mind that in the Fimez case the Alabama court did not
distinguish between the apportionment of compensatory and punitive damages. It is
known that punitive damages, alone, cannot be awarded. "Punitive damages do not
constitute a separate cause of action, but instead form a remedy available for some
tortious or otherwise unlawful acts; a demand or request for punitive damages is
parasitic and possesses no viability absent its attachment to a substantive cause of
action such as fraud. Thus, a claim for punitive damages must relate to some
separate cause of action which permits the recovery of such damages." 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 195 (2007).
92. This must have been the impression of the plaintiff in Fimez, interviewed for
the New York Times by Adam Liptak (American Exception: Foreign Courts Wary of
U.S. Punitive Damages, New York Times, March 26, 2008).
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court absent an independent cause of action93 and that the award
could therefore not be considered entirely punitive. There is always
an underlying compensatory portion (either economic or non-
economic) in any punitive damages award. If only the Alabama court
had elaborated on the different categories of damages, then the
enforcing judge would have had a chance to select, by following the
principles of their own legal system, which of the categories to
enforce. The apportionment of the different categories of damages is
regularly and clearly set forth by American courts. Unfortunately,
this was not the case here.
Third, when dealing with U.S. awards of punitive damages,
judges operating in continental Europe should try to identify the
amount of compensatory damages and limit their enforcement to the
portion of damages that are not punitive. Absent such a
differentiation, it should be the enforcing judge's responsibility to
read between the lines and, in the interest of justice, extrapolate a
number that would compensate, even if imprecisely, the plaintiff for
the losses incurred. Such determination should, at a minimum, take
into account the prevailing party's legal fees, 94 whose award, in the
absence of statutory authorization, is prohibited in the United
States.9 To do so, the enforcing judge should apply the guidelines
generally employed within her own jurisdiction to resolve similar
issues (e.g., through the "disability schedule and value table" judicial
scheduling),' with regard to the specificities of the case brought
before it.
Fourth, no Italian judge may create new remedies in absence of
statutory authority, especially if, functionally, criminal penalties
imposed within civil proceedings is what is at stake. In this context,
surprisingly, the Corte di Cassazione did not mention the system of
checks and balances set forth by Article 25 of the Italian Republic
Constitution, which is the greatest obstacle facing the judicial
93. See id.
94. By reference to article 11 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreement. Supra note 88.
95. See supra notes 28-30 (and accompanying text). Of course, it is the job of the
party seeking recognition - or better, its transnational counsel - to solicit the
enforcing court with concrete evidence of his or her economic and non-economic
losses, bearing in mind the indissoluble public policy hurdles existing between
punitive damages and civil law systems.
96. See Giovanni Comandd, supra note 36, at 290-98 (analyzing the "Franco-
Italian" approach to awarding non-economic damages).
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recognition of the punitive damages doctrine.
Moreover, and surprisingly, the Court did not even mention the
limit imposed on the judiciary by Article 25 of the Italian Republic's
Constitution: "[n]o person shall be punished but for a law entered
into effect before the commission of the offense." In other words, no
deprivation of liberty or property is permitted absent express
statutory authorization. Having established that punitive damages in
the United States serve in a civil process "the same purposes as
criminal penalties,"' it is highly improbable that punitive damages
will successfully pass this constitutional check in Italy. The same
holds true regardless of the origins of the punitive damages doctrine,
considered to be rooted in equity.98 The enforcing court is required to
identify the basic principles of the law of the foreign jurisdiction and
thus determine whether those principles are irreconcilable with the
corresponding principles of its own country. From this point of view,
it is clear that the established "substantially criminal" function of
punitive damages does not belong in the Italian legal system.
99
As simplistic as it seems, this is the core of the question. Judges
operating in civil law systems throughout continental Europe, unlike
their colleagues across the Atlantic, cannot create law or frame new
remedies without statutory authority.
97. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
98. Black's Law Dictionary defines equity as "the system of law or body of
principles originating in the English Court of Chancery and superseding the common
and statute law (together called 'law' in the narrower sense) when the two conflicts."
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). See also GEORGE T. BISPHAM, THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 1-2 (Joseph D. McCoy ed., 11th ed. 1931) (arguing that, "[i]n
order to begin to understand what equity is, it is necessary to understand what the
English High Court of Chancery was, and how it came to exercise what is known as
its extraordinary jurisdiction. Every true definition of equity must, be, to a greater or
less extent, a history."). Most importantly, equity may not and does not create new
substantive rights, Meyer v. City of Eufala, Okla., et. al., 132 F.2d 648 (10th Cir.
1942), or impose obligations not otherwise arising; in other words, "Equity does not
sit to confer a 4ndfall." 30A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM Equity § 2 (emphasis
added); see also generally Branham v. First Nat'l Bank, 78 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1935).
The latter reconstruction of the role of equity in common law systems, given by the
Corpus Juris Secundum, undermines the very foundations of some ideas according to
which the main reason to explain why civil law systems do not traditionally accept
punitive damages is that "[p]unitive damages awards developed in equity . .
Ostoni, supra note 1, at 245.
99. In this regard, it is important to underline that "the idea of a common law
decision making as opposed to a centralized command and control 'regulatory' model
is simply unknown in Europe." Mattei, supra note 86, at 75.
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Particularly today, after Philip Morrisjn which simply did not
take into account the guideposts timidly set forth in State Farm'°' in
evaluating the excessiveness of an award under the Excessive Fine
Clause, the state of affairs of the punitive damages doctrine in the
United States continues to be uncertain.
As previously mentioned, a transnational lawyer seeking
recognition of punitive damages awards is thus called to play a
creative role before the European enforcing judge, coming forward
with clear evidence of her client's compensable losses that - because
of the peculiarity of the United States legal system - had they not
been incorporated under the punitive damages label would remain
uncompensated.
100. See supra note 40.
101. In State Farm, the Court established that, for purposes of determining
whether an award of punitive damages is disproportionate under the Excessive Fine
Clause, an award that exceeds a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages may comport with due process where "a particularly egregious act has
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages." 538 U.S. at 425. "The
converse is also true, however. When compensatory damages are substantial, then a
lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost
limit of the due process guarantee." Id.
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Appendix A
(Author's Translation of Cass., 19 Jan. 2007, n. 1183)
Procedural Posture and Overview
P.J. filed petition in the Court of Appeals of Venice for the
recognition and enforcement of the judgment issued by the District
Court of Jefferson County (Alabama, United States). The court
ordered Fimez S.p.A. to pay P.J. $1 million for the damages resulting
from the death of her son P.V.K., who, according to that court's
finding, had been thrown from the seat of his motorcycle as a
consequence of a crash with an automobile, lost his helmet due to
design and manufacturing defects of the safety buckle produced by
Fimez, and, once on the floor, suffered severe injuries to his head,
which caused his death.
The Court of Appeals rejected such request, holding that the
Alabama judgment entailed an award of punitive damages,
conflicting with public policy."°
P.J. appealed that judgment before this Court for review.
Rationale
In her pleading (insufficient and contradictory rationale),
appellant argues that: (1) the judgment appealed bears an evident
contradiction where it states that the lack of rationale in a foreign
judgment does not bar a court from giving it legal effect in Italy, and,
at the same time, holds that it is possible to infer, from a lack of
evidentiary justifications in the assessment of damages by the
Alabama court, the punitive nature of the award... and (2) the court
erred both in considering the award excessive and in attributing it,
apodictically, punitive nature simply on the grounds of such
erroneous evaluation.
Such complaint is groundless and unacceptable.
No contradiction exists in stating that the lack of rationale in the
foreign judgment does not prevent a court from granting it exequatur
and making, from that same lack of rationale, an argument for the
punitive nature of the damages awarded by that judge.
Moreover, the lower court's reasoning cannot be considered
102. See Corte app., supra note 1.
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apodictic, as appellant asserts, on the ground that [the foreign court]
has provided no explanation of neither the criteria used in
determining the amount of damages nor the nature and kind of the
harm done. Excessiveness or disproportion of the award should be
instead viewed in accordance with the criteria generally used by the
Italian courts, considering also the sums already paid to the appellant
[in the settlement agreement] by the driver of the car implicated in
the accident, the firm manufacturer of the helmet, and other
defendants.
Moreover, the finding for the excessiveness of the damages
awarded by the foreign court and the definition of such award in
terms of punitive damages ... hinge upon the facts of the individual
situation and, therefore, should be left for the Court of Appeals,
whose finding cannot be reversed by this Court, especially if, as in the
instant case, it is appropriately and logically justified. Indeed, the
Supreme Court is entitled to reverse the judgment of a lower court,
on the ground of a different definition of domestic public order, and
check the appropriateness of the rationale adopted therein, but it
cannot interfere with the evaluation of the deed of which appellant
seeks recognition and enforcement, being a matter of fact...
[citations omitted].
With the second of her claims (violation of art. 797, n. 7, code of
civil procedure),' 3 appellant argues that the decision issued by the
American court is not contrary to public policy, on the assumption
that our system of civil liability consists of various legal institutions
pursuing punitive goals, such as penalty clauses and non-economic
damages.
Such grievance is groundless, as well.
Penalty clauses are not punitive in nature and do not carry any
retaliatory purpose. A penalty clause serves to strengthen a
103. As ultimately amended by Art. 10, d.l. October 10, 1996, n. 542, converted by
Law, December 23, 1996, n. 649, the court of first instance cannot recognize and
enforce a foreign judgment if its content is contrary to domestic public policy.
Today, absent an international agreement, a lawyer seeking recognition and
enforcement of a foreign money judgment in Italy should refer to the rules of the
Reform of Private International Law Act. Article 64 provides that the foreign
judgment is conclusive between the parties and automatically recognized in Italy
unless one of the seven factors listed under that article occur. To illustrate, Article
64(1)(g) expressly stops the automatic recognition mechanism where the foreign
judgment's provisions "produce effects contrary to public order." Law n. 218 of May
31, 1995, (in Gazz. Uff., 3 June 1995, n.128, S.O.).
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contractual relationship and quantify damages in advance, so that if
its provision entails, according to the judge's discretional appraisal, an
abuse in the parties' freedom of contract contrary the principle of
proportionality, it can be downsized by the judge. Hence, although
the sum agreed upon as a penalty is due by the breaching party
notwithstanding the proof of the harm suffered and a rigid correlation
with the extent of the latter, we conclude that penalty clauses cannot
be compared to the legal institution of punitive damages, peculiar to
Anglo-Saxon law, an institution that not only links itself to the
wrongdoer's conduct and not to the kind of harm done, but it is also
characterized by an unjustifiable disproportion between the damages
awarded and the harm actually suffered by the plaintiff.
Likewise, we hold that no overlap exists between an award of
moral damages and the punitive damages doctrine. Moral damages
reflect a loss suffered by the injured party, and recovery is anchored
to such loss. In the case of moral damages, indeed, the stress falls on
the plaintiff, not on the wrongdoer: the primary purpose of such
category of damages is to compensate the plaintiff, whereas in the
case of punitive damages, as we have seen, there is no
correspondence between the damages awarded to the plaintiff and
the harm actually suffered.
In the current legal system, the idea of punishment is alien to any
award of civil damages. The wrongdoer's conduct is also considered
irrelevant. The task of civil damages is to make the injured party
whole by means of an award of a sum of money, which tends to
eliminate the consequences of the harm done. The same holds true
for any category of damages, moral and non-economic damages
included, whose award not only is unresponsive to both the injured
parties' conditions and defendants' wealth, but it also requires that
plaintiffs prove the existence of a loss stemming from the offense,
resorting to concrete, factual evidence, on the assumption that such
evidence cannot be considered in re ipsa... [citations omitted].
The appeal is therefore rejected...
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